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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Council

8 November 1982

NOTE FOR: Acting DCI

FROM: NIO/LA

SUBJECT: NSC Review due 10 November 1982

- l. As you know, the DCI decided last Thursday that this Intelligence Assessment should be formally coordinated by NFIB.
- 2. The CIA-agreed-upon draft went to Walt Elder at NFIB tonight for coordination by 1400 Tuesday, 9 November.
- 3. You will receive a draft by cob tomorrow, and it will then be due to Deputy Secretary of State Dam by cob Wednesday, 10 November.
- 4. If there are serious NFIB problems, and we no not expect any, it might be advisable to have a meeting Wednesday morning to work these out. In any case, I hope that you, _____ and I might discuss this briefly before you sent it to State.


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Constantine C. Menges



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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

8 November 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board Principals

THROUGH:

Walter Elder, Executive Secretary National Foreign Intelligence Board

FROM:

Constantine C. Menges

National Intelligence Officer for Latin America

SUBJECT:

Cuban International Activities Inimical to US Interests

1. The attached draft Intelligence Community Assessment on "Cuban international activities inimical to US interests and other possible actions the Castro government may take in the next year" was written at the request of the National Security Council. The paper was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America and drafted by analysts in the Office of African and Latin American Analysis, CIA.

2. On Thursday, 4 November 1982, the DCI decided that this paper should be reviewed by the NFIB Principals. The NIO for Latin America met with his counterparts in DIA, INR, and NSA on Friday, 5 November, to discuss the preliminary draft.

3. The final paper must be sent to the Acting DCI on 9 November 1982, for transmittal to the Deputy Secretary of State by the due date of 10 November 1982. For that reason it is requested that you please call the Executive Secretary of NFIB (Walt Elder - with your comments and coordination by 1400 hours on Tuesday, 9 November. With the exception of DIA, the comments of NFIB representatives on the preliminary draft were not received in time to be incorporated into this text but will be reflected in the final text. If you have not commented by 1400 hours, the Executive Secretary will take it that you concur.

> Constitutive Hongest RP Constantine C. Menges

Attachment: as stated above

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
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SUBJECT: Cuban International Activities Inimical to US Interests



CUBAN INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES INIMICAL TO US INTERESTS*

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*This Intelligence Assessment was requested by the Special Assistant for National Security, Judge William Clark. It was prepared under the auspices of the NIO/LA by the Office of African and Latin American Analysis, CIA.

Cuban actions inimical to US interests: Summary

The likelihood of an accommodation with Castro in the next two years

The Castro regime is promoting a broad range of activities designed to undermine US influence worldwide. We believe these actions will continue as long as Fidel Castro and his guerrilla veterans remain in power. Only the intensity varies, determined by the conditions in each country and Cuba's ability to exploit them. Six former US presidents tried to negotiate Cuba into accommodation; all failed and the available intelligence information suggests that there is virtually no prospect for a genuine accommodation with Cuba on major issues in the next two years.

PART 1/Current Cuban international activities hostile to the US

In overview, Cuba has active subversive and military operations in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East while also using diplomacy, propaganda, and covert action for anti-US purposes world-wide and in Western Europe/Japan.

In Latin America and the Caribbean

- --Cuba is directly supporting active insurgencies in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Colombia and is laying the groundwork in Honduras, Costa Rica, and Chile. Hundreds of Latin American guerrillas have been trained in Cuba in recent years.
- --Havana is heavily engaged in the consolidation of power in Nicaragua and Grenada.
- --Where guernilla strategies are presently non-productive, Havana is relying on a mixture of diplomacy, propaganda, and non-violent covert action to undercut US influence.

In Africa:

--Cuba now has over 40,000 military and civilian personnel propping up Angola and Ethiopia and working in more than a dozen other countries. Four other African governments are the target of Cubanassisted subversive groups (South Africa, Namibia, Zaire, and Morocco).

In the Middle East:

--Cuba has aligned itself closely with the PLO and the radical Arab States (Libya and South Yemen).

In Europe:

--Cuba uses political and economic tactics to create and exploit differences between Washington and its allies.

PART 2/Possible additional Cuban activities hostile to US interests in 1983-84

During the coming 12-18 months, these activities will continue and in certain areas, will expand. The very nature of the Castro regime precludes anything but an adversary relationship between Havana and Washington. <u>Latin America</u> will continue to be a priority target.

- --Subversion will continue apace, especially in Central America.
- --Cuba will try to encourage and take advantage of the leftist drift in Suriname and Bolivia.
- --Concern over change in Panama's orientation could cause Havana to begin supporting subversive efforts there.
- --If the Sandinistas are seriously threatened, Havana would almost certainly send troops unless deterred by the credible threat of US military forces.
- --It is not certain, however, that Cuba's promotion of subversion will steadily increase in all cases. Under certain circumstances, Castro would be willing to reduce his revolutionary profile temporarily if convinced it would advance his overall goal of diminishing US influence in the hemisphere.
- --Cuba can be expected to promote strongly the creation of a regional organization that excludes the US.
- --Cuba will probably retaliate strongly with jamming of US domestic radio and counterbroadcasts if Radio Marti goes on the air; Castro might also threaten or mount another Mariel-type exodus of refugees to the US.

In Africa, Havana will maintain its military support for Angola and Ethiopia:

- --Cuba's reluctance to withdraw troops from Angola will hinder a Namibian settlement.
- --A deteriorating situation in Mozambique could bring an increased Cuban military presence there.

Elsewhere, Cuba is likely to:

- --Continue its cooperation with the PLO, Libya, and other radical Arab states.
- --Expand its efforts to create or exacerbate tensions between the US and its European allies.

PART 3/The military threat posed by Cuban and Soviet military-related assets in Cuba.

Cuba has over 250,000 persons in its armed forces, and an air force with more than 250 MIG fighters.

- --During peacetime, Cuba serves as a base for Soviet intelligence collecting activities against US government, military and commercial communications.
 - --In wartime, Cuba could serve as a recovery base for Soviet bombers while its air force and navy threaten Free World sea lines of communications and the Panama Canal.